The Calcutta High Court held that a writ petition against a private unaided school was maintainable where the challenged action related to the school’s public duty of imparting education, but refused interim permission to a 16-year-old student to sit for an internal examination pending challenge to his expulsion.
The Calcutta High Court has held that a writ petition challenging action taken by a private unaided school against a student is maintainable when the dispute concerns the school’s public duty of imparting education.
Justice Reetobroto Kumar Mitra passed the order in Avyya Todi & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., WPA/2929/2026, on April 22, 2026.
However, the Court refused to grant ad interim relief to petitioner no. 1, a 16-year-old student. He had sought permission to sit for an internal assessment/examination scheduled to commence on April 23, 2026.
The Court took up the matter urgently after the petitioners mentioned it. The examination, which had earlier been scheduled for sometime in mid-May 2026, had been preponed to April 23, 2026.
The order records that petitioner no. 1 is a 16-year-old boy pursuing the International Baccalaureate Diploma Programme.
The school suspended him on January 23, 2026 over an incident dated January 22, 2026. The school alleged that he and several others had physically bullied and mercilessly beaten a younger student of the same school, causing extreme mental trauma.
The petitioners denied the allegations. The suspension led to disciplinary proceedings.
The Court also referred to an earlier order passed by a coordinate Bench on February 6, 2026.
That order was carried in appeal. Thereafter, a Division Bench, by order dated February 13, 2026, directed the school to grant a hearing to the student and his parents before taking a final decision.
During the present hearing, the Court was told that the school had taken a final decision on March 30, 2026, expelling petitioner no. 1. However, the expulsion decision had not been placed on record.
Senior Advocate S.N. Mookherjee, appearing for the respondent school, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition.
He argued that the respondent school is a private unaided institution and does not fall within writ jurisdiction.
He submitted that admission of students and school administration remain within the exclusive domain of the school. According to him, such issues may, at best, be challenged in civil proceedings.
He further argued that petitioner no. 1, being 16 years old, cannot invoke the right to education under Article 21A of the Constitution. Article 21A applies only to children between 6 and 14 years.
The school relied on Purushottam Lal Singhania v. Delhi Public School & Ors., 2006 SCC OnLine Cal 339, and T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2002) 8 SCC 481.
Senior Advocate Jishnu Saha, appearing for the petitioners, submitted that a writ petition can lie against a private individual or body when such body performs a public function.
He argued that imparting education is a public function. Therefore, the school could not claim complete immunity from writ jurisdiction.
He relied on Miss Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666, St. Mary’s Education Society & Another v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Others, (2023) 4 SCC 498, Rakesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine HP 883, and Bineeta Patnaik Padhi v. Union of India and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine Cal 1662.
He also referred to the words “to any person or authority” in Article 226. He submitted that the High Court can issue writs not only against the State and its instrumentalities, but also against private persons or authorities when they discharge a public duty.
Justice Mitra held that the issue of whether a writ can issue against a private body discharging a public duty is no longer res integra.
The Court observed that a private unaided school cannot be brought entirely within the realm of State control. It also noted that courts cannot curtail the autonomy of such schools in a manner that destroys their independent character.
At the same time, the Court held that a school which imparts education performs a public duty. Therefore, it cannot function arbitrarily or whimsically.
The Court held that suspension and expulsion of a student have a direct nexus with the school’s duty to impart education. Such matters, the Court said, fall within the public domain for the purpose of Article 226.
The Court distinguished this dispute from a private employer-employee dispute involving a private school.
The Court accepted that Article 21A applies only to children between 6 and 14 years. Since petitioner no. 1 is 16 years old, he does not fall within the scope of Article 21A.
However, the Court held that the right to education has also been recognised as part of the right to life under Article 21.
Referring to Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, the Court observed that education forms part of the right to live with dignity, intellectual freedom, and full development of personality.
On that reasoning, the Court held that a student denied education can invoke the High Court’s powers under Article 226.
Accordingly, the Court held that the writ petition is maintainable.
Despite holding the writ petition maintainable, the Court refused to permit petitioner no. 1 to sit for the examination at the ad interim stage.
The Court noted that the petitioners had not placed the expulsion order on record. Therefore, the Court held that it would be inappropriate to examine the correctness, legality, or procedural propriety of the school’s action at this stage.
The Court also held that any restraint on the examination would prejudice the entire batch of students. Such an order could result in many students losing an academic year for no fault of theirs.
At the same time, the Court said that directing the school to allow petitioner no. 1 to sit for the examination would effectively keep the expulsion order in abeyance. Since the Court had not yet examined the expulsion order, such a direction would amount to judicial impropriety.
The Court observed that the balance of equities stood in a “clear 2:1 ratio”.
It said the balance favoured the school’s autonomy and the well-being and rights of the large number of students scheduled to sit for the examination.
The Court weighed these factors against the rights of the individual petitioner and declined interim relief.
The Court clarified that the examination is an internal examination conducted by the school itself.
Therefore, petitioner no. 1’s right to sit for that examination would remain subject to the outcome of the writ petition.
The Court further clarified that if the petitioners succeed, petitioner no. 1 will be permitted to sit for the examination at a later date. The school will have to arrange such examination to ensure that he does not lose an academic year.
The Court also granted the petitioners leave to file a supplementary affidavit bringing the expulsion order and other documents on record by April 30, 2026.
The Court directed the respondents to file affidavits in opposition by May 20, 2026. The petitioners may file their reply, if any, by June 20, 2026.
The matter will appear in the monthly combined list of July 2026.
