The Supreme Court has delivered an important ruling on the evidentiary value of approver testimony in criminal trials.
The Court held that a conviction can legally rest on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver if the court finds the evidence reliable and records reasons for that conclusion.
The Bench also clarified that when corroboration becomes necessary, it may be direct or circumstantial. Further, corroborative evidence need not independently prove every material allegation against the accused.
A Bench comprising Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Manoj Misra delivered the judgment.
Delhi Double Murder Case Led to the Appeal
The case arose from the recovery of two bodies in areas falling under different police jurisdictions in Delhi.
Investigators identified the deceased as the driver and cleaner of a truck.
According to the prosecution, the accused hired the truck under the pretext of transporting pumpkins.
However, the group allegedly planned to steal the vehicle.
The prosecution claimed that the accused murdered the driver and cleaner, disposed of their bodies, and stole the truck.
The Trial Court convicted the accused under Sections 302, 396, 201, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.
The Delhi High Court later upheld the convictions.
The accused then approached the Supreme Court.
Prosecution Relied Heavily on Approver’s Testimony
The prosecution’s case largely depended on the testimony of one accused who later became an approver.
After obtaining a pardon, he appeared as PW-1 during the trial.
PW-1 gave a detailed account of the conspiracy, the murders, and the disposal of evidence.
The appellant challenged the conviction.
He argued that PW-1’s testimony was self-serving and lacked independent corroboration on material facts.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument.
Supreme Court Examines Law on Accomplice Evidence
The Bench undertook a detailed examination of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Section 133 treats an accomplice as a competent witness. It also permits a conviction based solely on accomplice testimony.
However, Illustration (b) to Section 114 embodies a rule of prudence. Courts generally exercise caution before relying on accomplice evidence.
The Supreme Court reviewed several leading judgments on the subject.
These included State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (1963), Somasundaram @ Somu v. State (2020), and Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952).
The Court noted that accomplice testimony carries certain risks. Such witnesses may attempt to shift blame, minimise their own role, or implicate others to secure a pardon.
Nevertheless, the law does not automatically reject such evidence.
Corroboration Is a Rule of Prudence, Not Law
The Court reiterated that corroboration of approver testimony is not a mandatory legal requirement.
Instead, it remains a rule of judicial prudence.
The Bench observed:
“It is not an inviolable rule of law that testimony of an approver must be independently corroborated in material particulars before it could form the basis of conviction. The requirement of corroboration is not mandated by law but is a rule of prudence.”
The Court further clarified that corroboration, when required, may come from circumstantial evidence.
Importantly, corroborative material need not independently establish every fact alleged by the approver.
It is sufficient if the evidence makes the approver’s account believable in the overall circumstances of the case.
The Court also reaffirmed that one approver generally cannot corroborate another approver’s testimony.
Court Explains Test for Assessing an Approver’s Credibility
The Supreme Court also discussed the factors that courts should consider while evaluating an approver’s reliability.
Relying on Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana (1975), the Bench observed that an approver must present a natural, probable, and credible account of the events.
The testimony must implicate the accused in a manner that establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court also referred to Rampal Pithwa Rahidas v. State of Maharashtra (1994).
According to that judgment, courts should consider the circumstances of the approver’s arrest, his role in the offence, the extent of his participation, and the reasons that led him to become an approver.
Self-Exculpatory Testimony Not Automatically Unreliable
The appellant argued that PW-1 attempted to minimise his own role in the offence.
Therefore, he contended that the Court should reject the testimony.
The Supreme Court disagreed.
The Bench noted that PW-1 openly admitted his involvement in the conspiracy to steal the truck.
He also acknowledged his participation in the criminal acts.
Although his role appeared less significant than that of the other accused, he never denied involvement in the overall scheme.
Accordingly, the Court held that the allegedly self-exculpatory nature of the testimony did not make it unreliable.
Corroborative Evidence Supported the Prosecution Case
The Court then examined the corroborative evidence available on record.
It found several circumstances supporting PW-1’s version.
These included:
• Ownership and identification of the stolen truck.
• Recovery of the truck from co-accused persons.
• Identification of the deceased individuals.
• Medical evidence confirming homicidal deaths.
• Recovery of articles and documents supporting the prosecution’s narrative.
Taken together, these circumstances strengthened the credibility of the approver’s account.
The Court therefore concluded that PW-1 was neither planted nor unreliable.
Supreme Court Upholds Principles Governing Approver Evidence
Summarising the law, the Court held that judges may convict an accused solely on the basis of approver testimony if they find it trustworthy and record reasons for doing so.
Where courts seek corroboration, they may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence.
Further, corroboration need not independently prove every allegation against the accused.
Applying these principles, the Court found sufficient corroborative evidence supporting the approver’s testimony in the present case.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals.
