The Supreme Court on Thursday (17.09.2026) acquitted a man convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, now Section 137 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023). The Court held that the POCSO Presumption of Guilt under Sections 29 and 30 is not absolute. It found that the prosecution had failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice NV Anjaria set aside the Delhi High Court ruling that had upheld the trial court’s decision. The bench held that inconsistencies and lack of corroboration can weaken the statutory presumption. Once the accused successfully establishes such defects, “the presumption of guilt would no longer remain effective.”
Conviction And Delhi High Court Proceedings
The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. It sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment under the POCSO Act along with a fine. It also imposed one year’s rigorous imprisonment under Section 363 IPC.
The trial court acquitted him under Section 506 IPC (now Section 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023).
The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence before the Delhi High Court. The High Court upheld both the conviction and sentence.
Allegations Against The Appellant
The case concerned the complainant’s (PW 5) two-and-a-half-year-old daughter. The child allegedly went missing while playing near a jhuggi. The prosecution alleged that the appellant took her to a nearby park.
After the child returned home, the complainant allegedly noticed blood on her clothing. The child was also alleged to have named the appellant.
The police filed a chargesheet under Sections 363, 376 and 506 IPC and Sections 4 and 5 of the POCSO Act. The court later framed charges under Sections 363 and 506 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act.
Supreme Court Notes Material Contradictions
The Supreme Court examined the testimony of the complainant and the private doctor initially consulted. It found “manifest contradictions” between their versions.
Their statements differed on the time when the child reached the doctor for examination. They also gave different accounts about who accompanied the child.
The Court observed:
“This inconsistency could not be brushed aside to be a minor kind or insignificant in nature more particularly when read with the facts of the case and other attendant evidence.”
The bench also noted that the FIR did not contain some material aspects later mentioned by the complainant. She also claimed that she had informed the police over the telephone. However, no police witness corroborated this claim.
The Court further noted that the police registered the FIR two days after the alleged incident.
Medical And Forensic Evidence
The Supreme Court closely examined the medical and forensic evidence. It found that the evidence did not support the prosecution’s version.
PW 1 claimed that she noticed reddishness on the child’s private part. However, the doctor who examined the child at AIIMS found no injury. The doctor also found no bloodstains over the vulva area. The examination showed that the child’s hymen remained intact and disclosed no abnormality.
The forensic expert, PW 8, examined seven parcels sent for biological and DNA testing. The tests detected neither semen nor male DNA. They also failed to detect blood on the child’s clothing.
The bench distinguished the case from cases where the absence of injuries or semen alone does not disprove sexual assault.
Relying on State of UP v Babul Nath, the Court identified a “conspicuous differentiating factor.” It said the doctor’s evidence, when read with the FSL report, “completely ruled out the possibility of any penetrative act.”
Evidence Fails Sterling Witness Test
The Supreme Court also examined whether the complainant’s testimony met the standard of a sterling witness.
It referred to Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v State (NCT of Delhi) and Ganesan v State. The Court found that the contradictions and absence of medical corroboration weakened the complainant’s evidence.
The bench observed:
“The various gaps in the testimony of PW-5, contradictions with evidence of other witnesses and the FSL and medical evidence revealing quite contrary, the prosecution story led by the evidence of PW-5 never remained intact but miserably descended to the stage of lack of proof.”
Defence Cites Previous Enmity
The appellant argued that a previous dispute had led to the complaint. The dispute concerned a shared water connection between the two families’ jhuggis.
During cross-examination, the complainant admitted that the families shared a common water connection. She also admitted that a quarrel had taken place.
The Court considered these admissions along with the weaknesses in the prosecution evidence. It found that the defence version gained significance because medical evidence did not support the prosecution’s case.
The bench held:
“In wake of the inconsistent prosecution evidential version, further weakened by non-supportive medical evidence, the story of previous enmity on account of water-quarrel could gain cogent ground to become believable and acceptable. It could therefore be said that the complaint was a motivated one filled with ill-intention and out of enmity.”
Sections 29 And 30 Of POCSO Act
The Supreme Court then examined Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act.
Section 29 raises a presumption of guilt after the prosecution establishes the necessary foundational facts. Section 30 deals with the presumption of culpable mental state. The accused can rebut that presumption.
The Court described these provisions as a “departure from the cardinal rule in criminal jurisprudence that the accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty.”
However, the Court made clear that the POCSO Presumption of Guilt does not operate automatically or absolutely.
The bench relied on the Bombay High Court’s ruling in Navin Dhaniram Baraiye v State of Maharashtra. That decision held that Section 29 operates only after the prosecution first establishes the foundational facts required to invoke the presumption.
The Supreme Court also cautioned courts against mechanically relying on these presumptive provisions.
“The court should not mechanically accept the ipse dixit of the prosecution riding on the provisions regarding presumption of guilt to give a stamp of approval to every prosecution even if they are absurd or improbable in its story. At the end of the trial, the accused should not stand at a discount or at disadvantage only for the reason that the particular statute under which he is tried for the offence contains presumptive provisions about the guilt of the accused,” the bench held.
Prosecution Must Prove Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt
The Court referred to Naresh Kumar alias Nitu v State of Himachal Pradesh, Noor Aga v State of Punjab, and Gangadhar alias Gangaram v State of Madhya Pradesh.
It reiterated that an accused needs to rebut a statutory presumption only on the standard of preponderance of probability. In contrast, the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The statutory presumption does not reduce the prosecution’s burden.
The bench also relied on Kali Ram v State of Himachal Pradesh. It reiterated that courts must adopt the view favouring the accused when the evidence reasonably permits two views.
Courts must also resolve reasonable doubt in favour of the accused, irrespective of its impact on public perception.
The bench stressed the need for an objective assessment of the evidence. It said courts “should not overweigh itself with the provisions like that of Section29 or Section 30 of the POCSO Act” while considering whether an accused deserves acquittal.
Supreme Court Acquits Appellant
After examining the evidence as a whole, the Supreme Court found that the appellant had successfully rebutted the prosecution’s case. The prosecution, meanwhile, failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court therefore set aside the findings of the trial court and the Delhi High Court and acquitted the appellant.
The bench concluded:
“Even if initially the provisions of Section 29 and Section 30 of the POCSO Act operated to raise presumption against the accused, the evidence of the prosecution manifested inconsistencies, improbabilities and material contradictions. The medical evidence was non-corroborative in all respects, suggesting the non-commission of offence on part of the appellant. The defence story put forth by the appellant was cogent and its evidentiary value had the effect of crumbling the prosecution story. In the total perspective of evidence on record, it could hardly be said that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant,much less beyond reasonable doubt.”
