The Court held that sanction under Sections 196 and 197 CrPC is required only at the stage of taking cognizance, not for FIR registration or investigation ordered by a Magistrate.
Magistrate’s Section 156(3) Power Operates Before Cognizance
The Supreme Court has held that a Judicial Magistrate does not need prior sanction under Sections 196 or 197 CrPC before ordering FIR registration under Section 156(3) CrPC.
A Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta said sanction applies only when a court takes cognizance.
The Court said the same rule applies under the corresponding provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.
The Bench clarified that FIR registration and investigation take place before cognizance.
Prior Sanction Applies Only At Cognizance Stage
The Court said a Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) CrPC before taking cognizance.
The Bench relied on Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan, (2006) 1 SCC 627.
In that case, the Supreme Court held that a direction for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC does not amount to cognizance.
The Court also referred to State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju, (2006) 6 SCC 728, and Sakiri Vasu.
It said these decisions clearly explain the legal position.
An order under Section 156(3) CrPC cannot amount to cognizance under Section 190 CrPC.
FIR Registration Cannot Depend On Prior Sanction
The Bench cautioned against linking FIR registration with prior sanction.
The Court said such a requirement would disturb the statutory sequence under criminal procedure.
It explained that the process starts with information about a cognizable offence.
Police then register an FIR and conduct investigation.
After investigation, police submit a report under Section 173 CrPC.
Only after that stage does the court consider cognizance.
The Court therefore held that sanction operates only as a condition for taking cognizance.
It does not control FIR registration or investigation.
PC Act Judgments Do Not Apply
The Supreme Court rejected reliance on Anil Kumar v. Ayyappa and L. Narayana Swamy v. State of Karnataka, (2016) 9 SCC 598.
The Bench said those cases arose under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The Court also noted that Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora has referred the correctness of those judgments to a larger Bench.
Brinda Karat Petition Partly Allowed
The ruling came in a plea filed by CPI(M) leader Brinda Karat.
Karat had challenged the Delhi High Court’s rejection of her petition seeking FIR registration.
She sought FIR registration against BJP leaders Kapil Sharma, Anurag Thakur and others over alleged hate speeches before the 2020 Delhi riots.
The Magistrate had refused to direct FIR registration.
The Magistrate held that prior sanction was necessary.
The Delhi High Court upheld that view.
The Supreme Court partly allowed Karat’s petition on the legal issue.
It set aside the High Court’s observation on prior sanction.
The Court held that a Magistrate can direct FIR registration under Section 156(3) CrPC without prior sanction.
However, on merits, the Supreme Court approved the Delhi High Court’s view.
Court Declines To Frame New Hate Speech Directions
The Court delivered the judgment in a batch of cases concerning hate speeches and hate crimes.
The Bench said existing law already deals with hate speech offences.
It declined to issue directions for creating new hate speech offences.
The Court left that issue to the legislature.
It said legislative authorities may consider policy or legal measures, if required.
Complete Statutory Remedies Exist
The Supreme Court also reiterated the rule in Lalita Kumari.
Police must register an FIR when information discloses a cognizable offence.
If police refuse to register an FIR, the complainant can approach the Superintendent of Police.
This remedy lies under Section 154(3) CrPC or Section 173(4) BNSS.
The complainant can then approach the Magistrate.
This remedy lies under Section 156(3) CrPC or Section 175 BNSS.
The complainant may also file a complaint under Section 200 CrPC or Section 223 BNSS.
The Court said these remedies form a complete statutory framework.
It added that Articles 32 and 226 also provide constitutional remedies.
The Bench therefore held that no legislative vacuum exists.
