The Delhi High Court has clarified that the limitation period under Section 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 begins from the date when a police officer first acquires knowledge of the commission of an offence. The Court held that limitation does not run from the later date of FIR registration.
Applying this principle, Justice Neena Bansal Krishna quashed a chargesheet filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), holding that it was barred by limitation.
Background of the Case
The ruling arose from a criminal revision petition filed by a public servant accused of illegally running a private business. The CBI initiated prosecution after conducting a search and seizure operation in 1995. During the search, investigators recovered documents allegedly disclosing the offence.
Despite detecting the alleged misconduct in 1995, the agency registered the FIR at a later stage. The CBI ultimately filed the chargesheet in 1998. By then, the statutory limitation period had already expired.
Prosecution’s Stand on Limitation
The CBI argued that the limitation period should be calculated from the date of FIR registration. It also relied on the time taken to obtain expert and forensic opinions, including reports from the Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL), to justify the delay.
Court’s Analysis of Sections 468 and 469 CrPC
Rejecting the prosecution’s submissions, the High Court closely examined Sections 468 and 469 of the CrPC. These provisions govern the limitation period for taking cognisance of offences.
The Court noted that Section 469 clearly states that when the commission of an offence is not known on the date it occurs, limitation begins on the day the offence comes to the knowledge of the police officer.
Justice Krishna observed that the investigating agency had admittedly gained such knowledge in 1995 itself. The seizure of incriminating documents during the search disclosed the alleged offence at that stage.
Accordingly, the Court held that limitation commenced from the date of seizure. The subsequent registration of the FIR could not postpone the running of limitation.
“The period of limitation is to commence from the date of knowledge of the police officer. Prima facie, the offence was disclosed from the seizure of the documents itself. The delay cannot be attributed to the time taken by the FSL,” the Court observed.
Preliminary Enquiry Does Not Extend Limitation
The Court also rejected the CBI’s reliance on the preliminary enquiry. It held that procedural steps such as recording witness statements or forming a prima facie opinion do not extend or reset the limitation period.
Once the offence stood disclosed in 1995, the limitation clock began to run. It could not restart due to later investigative actions.
The Court concluded that limitation commenced either on 24 November 1995 or 1 February 1996. It did not begin on 24 November 1997, when the regular case was registered.
Chargesheet Quashed
Finding no grounds to condone a delay of nearly two years, the Delhi High Court allowed the revision petition. It set aside the CBI’s chargesheet as time-barred.
Case Details
Case Title: Bachu Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation
Appearances:
- Mrs. Anita Sahani, Advocate, with Dr. Shiv Kumar Tiwari, Advocate, for the petitioner
- Mrs. Anubha Bhardwaj, Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI, with Ms. Anchal Kashyap and Ms. Ananya Shamshery, Advocates, for the respondent
