The Delhi High Court has ruled that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 does not give an aggrieved woman an absolute right to re-enter a matrimonial property that she has voluntarily vacated. The Court held that such relief cannot be granted when suitable alternate accommodation exists.
Justice Ravinder Dudeja made the observation while dismissing a petition filed by an 81-year-old woman who sought restoration of possession in her matrimonial home.
Challenge to Trial Court Orders
The petitioner challenged trial court orders that rejected her application under Sections 19 and 23 of the Domestic Violence Act. She had sought a residence order allowing her re-entry into the matrimonial home property.
She claimed that she had lived in the matrimonial home for nearly six decades. In April 2023, she shifted to her daughter’s residence for medical treatment. However, when she tried to return in July 2023, she alleged that she was denied entry.
Court Examines Circumstances of Shift
Justice Dudeja examined the reasons behind her relocation. The Court noted that she had moved to another property owned by her husband. She was not rendered roofless. Importantly, she did not show that violence or coercion forced her to leave the matrimonial home.
The Court also referred to her complaint, where she stated that she shifted for medical treatment.
Relief Under Section 19 Is Discretionary
The Court clarified that relief under Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act is discretionary and equitable. The statute balances the rights of the aggrieved woman with those of other occupants and property owners.
Justice Dudeja observed that directing restoration in this case would disturb the settled possession of current occupants. Such a direction would convert a protective statute into a tool for re-entry into any past residence. That, the Court said, would go beyond legislative intent.
Alternate Accommodation Available
The Court further noted that suitable alternate accommodation of the same standard was available to the petitioner. Therefore, she could not insist on re-entry into the Green Park property.
In view of the discretionary nature of relief under Section 19 and the availability of alternate accommodation, the Court held that she was not entitled to a residence order directing restoration.
Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.
