The Delhi High Court held that an employer may suspend an employee facing an inquiry under the PoSH Act by exercising powers under service rules, but ruled that a pre-ICC fact-finding committee on sexual harassment complaints is impermissible and set aside the suspension order against Ramanujan College Principal Prof. Rasal Singh for being stigmatic.
The Delhi High Court has held that the absence of a specific suspension provision under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 does not stop an employer from suspending an employee facing an inquiry under the Act.
Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav held that the power of suspension rests with the employer. The Court said the applicable service rules and office regulations govern that power, not the PoSH Act itself.
The judgment was pronounced on April 24, 2026 in Prof. Rasal Singh v. University of Delhi & Ors., W.P.(C) 14760/2025. The Court had reserved the judgment on March 27, 2026.
The petition was filed by Prof. Rasal Singh, Principal of Ramanujan College, University of Delhi.
He challenged three actions: the constitution of an ad hoc committee by the Deputy Registrar (Colleges), University of Delhi; the committee’s report dated June 23, 2025; and the suspension order dated September 18, 2025, passed by Ramanujan College on the basis of that report.
The dispute raised two main questions. First, whether the College could suspend the petitioner in a matter arising under the PoSH Act. Second, whether the University could set up an ad hoc fact-finding committee after receiving complaints alleging misconduct, including sexual harassment.
According to the order, respondent nos. 3 to 5 are Assistant Professors at Ramanujan College.
Between March 13, 2025 and April 24, 2025, they submitted complaints to the University of Delhi and the College against the petitioner.
On May 5, 2025, the Deputy Registrar (Colleges), DU, constituted a fact-finding committee to examine the allegations.
The committee submitted its report on June 23, 2025. It opined that the charges were in the nature of sexual harassment.
The committee also stated that the complainants felt threatened and unsafe because the petitioner held a position of authority. It further recorded that an atmosphere of fear and anxiety had been created.
The committee recommended that the complaints be referred to the Internal Complaints Committee of the University of Delhi.
On September 26, 2025, the High Court stayed the operation of the suspension order on an interim basis.
The Court also left it open to the concerned Internal Complaints Committee to decide whether any interim measures against the petitioner were required. These measures could include suspension or other restrictions.
The respondents challenged the interim order through Letters Patent Appeals.
A Division Bench disposed of the appeals on October 15, 2025. It requested the Single Judge to decide the matter expeditiously.
The Division Bench specifically referred to two issues: the power of a University or College to suspend a Principal in a PoSH case, and the power to constitute an ad hoc fact-finding committee after receiving a PoSH complaint.
Senior Advocate Geeta Luthra, with Advocates Shalini Singh, Prashansika Thakur and Lakshay Saini, appeared for the petitioner.
The petitioner argued that only the Internal Complaints Committee can decide whether an allegation of sexual harassment is made out.
He submitted that when a statute prescribes a specific manner for doing an act, the authority must follow that manner alone.
The petitioner also argued that the disciplinary action rested on findings recorded in an inquiry allegedly conducted in violation of natural justice.
He further contended that even if the College had the power to suspend him, the suspension order carried a stigma and deserved to be set aside.
Senior Advocates Jayant K. Mehta and Nikhil Goel, along with counsel Mohinder JS Rupal, appeared for the respondents.
They argued that an employer, including the head of a College or University, has an inherent right to suspend an officer under its employment.
They submitted that no law bars the constitution of a fact-finding committee to assist an employer in discharging its duties.
The respondents also argued that the concept of stigma does not apply to suspension orders. According to them, stigma becomes relevant only in punitive actions such as termination or dismissal.
The Court held that the power of suspension lies with the concerned College, University, or institution in relation to teachers, principals, and other employees.
Justice Kaurav observed that this power is inherent in the office itself. The Court said an employer may exercise it even without a contractual or statutory stipulation, if the larger interest of the institution requires such action.
The Court referred to R.P. Kapur v. Union of India and Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra.
Relying on those decisions, the Court held that an employer can suspend an employee pending inquiry into misconduct. However, the employer must follow the applicable rules regarding payment during the suspension period.
The Court observed that the PoSH Act neither grants the power of suspension afresh nor takes it away.
Referring to Section 28 of the PoSH Act, the Court held that the Act operates “in addition to” and “not in derogation” of other laws.
Therefore, service rules and disciplinary regulations continue to operate alongside the PoSH framework.
The Court held that the power of suspension draws its life from the employment contract, service rules, and the inherent authority of the employer. It does not arise from the PoSH Act.
The Court noted that Section 12 of the PoSH Act provides for interim measures during the pendency of an inquiry.
However, Section 12 does not specifically mention suspension of the respondent employee.
Even so, the Court said it would be “unfathomable” to declare that a person facing sexual harassment complaints cannot be suspended pending ICC proceedings.
The Court clarified that an employer may use its inherent powers to suspend such a person. Such suspension would supplement the ICC proceedings and would not derogate from them.
The Court then examined the legality of the ad hoc fact-finding committee.
It held that a committee set up to decide whether sexual harassment occurred, or whether the facts amount to sexual harassment, falls outside the scheme of the PoSH Act.
The Court observed that the PoSH Act creates a carefully designed mechanism to deal with sexual harassment complaints through the ICC or the Local Committee.
Justice Kaurav held that a pre-ICC fact-finding committee may affect the sanctity of the statutory inquiry. It may also delay proceedings under the Act.
The Court held that the ad hoc fact-finding committee lacked statutory mandate and governing rules.
It said the committee offended both the express provisions of the PoSH Act and the foundational principles of natural justice.
The Court observed that complaints of sexual harassment stand on a distinct footing.
Once the legislature designates the ICC or the Local Committee as the authority to inquire into such complaints, any parallel or pre-ICC fact-finding body falls outside the statutory scheme.
The Court next considered whether the suspension order dated September 18, 2025 was stigmatic.
The order referred to written complaints by three faculty members alleging “serious misconduct and harassment”. It also stated that the petitioner was being suspended, considering the gravity of the matter, pending the outcome of the ICC inquiry.
The Court held that any individual reading the order would form a negative opinion about the petitioner.
It observed that the words “serious misconduct and harassment” would create an unfavourable and prejudicial impression.
Justice Kaurav held that the employer had not merely recited background facts.
The Court said the order reproduced the nature of the allegations and placed emphasis on their seriousness and gravity.
According to the Court, this amounted to a characterisation of the allegations. The employer could not do so at the stage of suspension.
The Court held that the employer’s role at that stage was limited. It could only decide whether the employee’s continuance in service would prejudice the inquiry or otherwise harm public interest.
The employer could not adjudicate upon, or publicly affirm, the character of the allegations.
The Court concluded that an employer may suspend a person facing an inquiry under the PoSH Act, even though the Act does not list suspension as an interim measure.
At the same time, the Court held that an employer cannot create a fact-finding committee to decide whether a complaint should go to the ICC or Local Committee. Such a process is de hors the PoSH Act and impermissible in law.
The Court also held that the suspension order in the present case was stigmatic and deserved to be set aside.
Accordingly, the Delhi High Court set aside the suspension order dated September 18, 2025.
However, the Court granted liberty to Ramanujan College to pass a fresh order in accordance with law.
The writ petition, along with all pending applications, was disposed of.
