The Delhi High Court political advertisements Delhi Metro ruling has upheld the Election Commission of India’s decision to ban political advertisements in Delhi Metro trains and stations during the Model Code of Conduct (MCC). The Court held that the restriction is reasonable and constitutionally valid. It said the measure helps maintain a level playing field during elections and supports free and fair electoral processes.
A Division Bench comprising Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora dismissed LPA 16/2020, M/s EG Communications Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Election Commission of India & Ors. The Bench affirmed the Single Judge’s decision dated January 9, 2020. It found no reason to interfere with the Election Commission’s directions requiring the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) to prohibit political advertisements during the MCC. The Court delivered the judgment on June 19, 2026.
Background
The appellants are advertising companies that obtained long-term licences from DMRC to display advertisements on metro trains, stations, and related properties.
The dispute began after the Election Commission issued a communication on June 13, 2019. The Commission directed Public Sector Undertakings, including DMRC, to include a clause prohibiting political advertisements during the MCC. In compliance, DMRC amended its licence agreements. The new clause barred political advertisements during the MCC and required immediate removal of existing political advertisements once the Code came into force.
The advertising agencies challenged the clause. They argued that earlier Election Commission communications had allowed political advertisements at commercially authorised sites. They also claimed they had structured their bids and revenue projections on the expectation of election-related advertising income throughout the ten-year licence period.
The Single Judge dismissed their writ petition. The agencies then filed the present Letters Patent Appeal.
Appellants’ Contentions
Senior Advocate Ashish Mohan, appearing for the appellants, argued that the restriction violated Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
He submitted that the Election Commission later clarified through its October 1, 2019 letter that political advertisements could appear at bus queue shelters and other authorised advertising sites during the MCC. According to the appellants, banning such advertisements in Metro premises while allowing them elsewhere created an unreasonable classification without an intelligible differentia.
The appellants also argued that the June 13, 2019 communication lacked statutory force. Therefore, it could not restrict fundamental rights. They relied on decisions such as Budhan Choudhary v. State of Bihar, Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, and Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union v. Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai.
They further challenged DMRC’s decision to insert the clause into existing licence agreements. According to them, the modification contradicted the contractual terms under which they had secured the advertising rights.
Election Commission’s Stand
Standing Counsel Sanjay Vashishtha, appearing for the Election Commission, argued that the communications merely implemented instructions issued on December 29, 2015. Those instructions required public sector undertakings to prohibit political advertisements during the MCC.
He submitted that Article 324 grants the Election Commission broad powers to issue directions in election-related matters where no statutory framework exists. He relied on Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms and S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu.
The Commission also argued that the restriction applied only during the MCC. It did not prohibit commercial advertising in general. Therefore, it constituted a reasonable restriction that advanced the objective of free and fair elections.
The Commission further stated that disputes concerning amendments to licence agreements were contractual in nature. It pointed out that the agreements already contained arbitration clauses.
Appearing for DMRC, Tarun Johri stated that DMRC had reservations about the distinction between Metro premises and other public advertising spaces. However, as a public sector undertaking, it had to comply with the Election Commission’s directions.
Court’s Observations
The Division Bench agreed with the Single Judge’s reasoning. It noted that the appellants functioned as service providers displaying third-party advertisements. The restriction did not completely curtail either their freedom of speech or their right to conduct business.
The Court emphasised that the restriction applied only to political advertisements during the MCC. The appellants remained free to display all other categories of advertisements.
While rejecting the Article 14 challenge, the Court accepted the Election Commission’s argument that metro stations and trains differ from bus shelters and roadside advertising sites. The Court noted that the public closely associates Metro infrastructure with the government. Restricting political advertisements in such spaces reduces the risk of perceived governmental endorsement of political messages.
The Bench also observed that even if authorities had permitted political advertisements at bus shelters, the appellants could not claim “negative equality.” It noted that the Model Code itself restricts political advertisements on public properties, including bus stands.
On the Article 19 challenge, the Court held that the restriction did not amount to a complete ban on business activities. It only limited one category of advertisements for a short period. Therefore, it remained a reasonable restriction on trade and business.
The Court further accepted the Election Commission’s submission that Article 324 empowers it to issue binding directions where legislation is silent. It concluded that the impugned instructions satisfied constitutional requirements and remained legally enforceable.
Decision
In the Delhi High Court political advertisements Delhi Metro case, the Division Bench held that the restriction serves the larger public interest of conducting free, fair, and transparent elections. Finding no error in the Single Judge’s ruling, the Court dismissed the appeal and disposed of all pending applications as infructuous.
