The Bombay High Court at Goa held that while an Internal Complaints Committee could not describe the instigator of a false sexual harassment complaint as an “unknown source” when the complainant had named him, Section 14 of the POSH Act does not permit action against such an instigator because the provision applies only to the woman or person who made the complaint.
Bombay High Court Says Instigator Of False POSH Complaint Cannot Be Proceeded Against Under Section 14
The Bombay High Court at Goa has partly allowed a writ petition filed by a government employee who challenged an Industrial Tribunal order dismissing his appeal against an ICC report in a sexual harassment matter. Justice Dr. Neela Gokhale held that the petitioner was entitled to challenge the ICC’s omission of the name of the alleged instigator of a false complaint, but refused to grant relief seeking action against that person under Section 14 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, holding that the provision applies only to the woman or person who made the complaint.
The case arose from a complaint of sexual harassment made by respondent no. 4 against the petitioner, Shrinivas Shinde, a Lower Division Clerk with the Directorate of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship. Respondents nos. 1 and 2 were the employer authorities, respondent no. 3 was the Principal of Panaji Government Industrial Institute, and respondent no. 4 was the complainant. The petitioner sought to quash the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court’s order dated November 26, 2025 in Appeal No. SH/01-2025 and also sought, in the alternative, a direction for disciplinary proceedings against respondent no. 3 for allegedly instigating a false and malicious complaint.
On November 29, 2024, respondent no. 4 lodged a complaint to the Director of respondent no. 1 alleging that the petitioner harassed her on the basis of her disability, did not cooperate with her, passed discriminatory remarks including “go to hell,” stared at her in an unpleasant and unprofessional manner, and behaved aggressively and abnormally. An Internal Complaints Committee was then constituted to inquire into the complaint. The petitioner denied the allegations in his reply dated January 2, 2025 and expressed suspicion that the complaint had been made at the instigation of a third person.
During the ICC’s preliminary inquiry on January 3, 2025, respondent no. 4 stated that the complaint had not been prepared by her, that she was unaware of its contents, and that the petitioner had neither sexually harassed her nor troubled her on account of her disability. She specifically stated that the complaint had been prepared by respondent no. 3, the Principal, and that she had been threatened with consequences if she refused to sign it. On January 6, 2025, she withdrew all allegations in writing and affirmed before the ICC that she wished to do so voluntarily because the allegations were false.
The ICC nevertheless concluded, in its report dated January 10, 2025, that the complaint had been instigated by an “unknown source” and recommended to the employer that the case of respondent no. 4 was a malicious complaint. The inquiry was closed and penalties against the complainant under the POSH Act were waived. The petitioner’s grievance was confined to the ICC’s omission of respondent no. 3’s name despite the retraction letter clearly attributing instigation and threats to him.
The petitioner then filed an appeal before the Industrial Tribunal and Labour Court, Government of Goa, under Section 18 of the POSH Act. He argued that the ICC had overlooked Section 14, failed to recommend action against respondent no. 3, wrongly described the instigator as “unknown,” and was protecting respondent no. 3. Respondent no. 3 challenged the maintainability of the appeal, and the Tribunal dismissed it, holding that the petitioner was not directly affected by the ICC’s conclusion and that no action could be initiated against respondent no. 3 under Section 14 without verifying the truthfulness of the complainant’s retraction.
The High Court held that the petitioner was plainly a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of Section 18 of the POSH Act and had a statutory right of appeal. The Court said it was not necessary for such a person to show direct injury. It found that the Tribunal was right to note that the truth of the complainant’s retraction had not been substantively tested, but held that this could not by itself justify dismissal of the appeal as not maintainable. The Court observed that the ICC’s conclusion had been recorded on a preliminary inquiry and that, before the proceedings could go further, respondent no. 4 had specifically named respondent no. 3 as the instigator of the false complaint.
Justice Gokhale held that, having relied on the retraction letter to close the complaint, the ICC could not selectively omit the name of respondent no. 3 from its conclusion. The Court found that the ICC clearly erred in recording that respondent no. 4 had been instigated by an “unknown source” when the same retraction letter named respondent no. 3. It further held that the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error in failing to address this limited grievance. The Court therefore declined to remand the matter, calling such a remand an exercise in futility, and instead corrected the error itself in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the High Court quashed the Tribunal’s order dated November 26, 2025 and directed that, instead of the words “unknown source” in the conclusion paragraph of the ICC report dated January 10, 2025, the conclusion should read: “The Respondent No. 3 instigated the Respondent No. 4 to file a false sexual harassment case against the Petitioner.”
The Court, however, rejected the petitioner’s prayers seeking action against respondent no. 3 under Section 14 of the POSH Act and a direction to the employer to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him under that statute. It examined Sections 14, 9 and 2(a) of the POSH Act and held that a complaint under the Act can be made only by an “aggrieved woman” or by a person acting on her behalf in the circumstances contemplated by Section 9(2). Therefore, the punishment provision in Section 14 is confined to the woman or person who has made the complaint, or to a witness who has given false evidence or produced forged or misleading documents. Since respondent no. 3 was neither the aggrieved woman nor the person who made the complaint, the statute did not permit action against him under Section 14 merely on the basis of the complainant’s retraction.
The writ petition was accordingly partly allowed. The Industrial Tribunal’s order was set aside, the ICC report was modified to substitute “unknown source” with respondent no. 3’s name, and the petitioner was given liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings against respondent no. 3 before an appropriate forum, if permissible in law. The Court added that if such proceedings were initiated, respondent no. 3 would have to be given an opportunity of hearing to defend himself.
